We tend to imagine election interference as a high-tech operation run by shadow agencies in bunkers. But in reality, influencing a national vote often comes down to something much simpler: the ability to pretend to be a neighbor. To spread rumors effectively on a community group chat, a bad actor cannot look like an outsider- they need a local phone number. And according to a sweeping new analysis, buying that disguise is as easy as shopping online, provided you are willing to pay the political surge pricing.
A team of researchers from the University of Cambridge has uncovered a direct link between national elections and the black market for fake digital identities. By tracking the prices of illicit account verifications across the globe, they found that the cost to register a fake account on messaging apps like WhatsApp and Telegram jumps significantly in the weeks leading up to a national vote. It’s a stark example of supply and demand: when political stakes rise, so does the market value of a fake local constituent.
This volatility was caught by the new “Cambridge Online Trust and Safety Index” (COTSI), a tool developed by researchers Anton Dek and Jon Roozenbeek. Their study, published in *Science*, monitored the daily price of SMS verifications for over 500 online platforms in 197 countries. While the price for a generic fake account remained flat during election seasons, messaging apps told a different story. The reason? These apps make a user’s phone number visible, forcing manipulators to buy “local” numbers to maintain their cover.
“Messaging apps, however, make it easy to see where an account is from, thus incentivizing the registration of local (inauthentic) accounts.” – Paper Authors, Science
The Economics of Digital Deception
While election interference grabs the headlines, these price spikes are just temporary blips in a massive, year-round economy. The researchers describe a “gray market” that operates with the professionalism of a legitimate logistics company. There are at least 17 major providers of these services, operating publicly accessible websites that cater primarily to Russian- and Chinese-speaking customers. These aren’t hidden dark web portals; they are slick e-commerce storefronts where a credit card or crypto payment buys you a one-time password (OTP) to bypass the security of almost any major app.
The scale of this operation is industrial. To feed the demand, providers rely on “SIM farms”- physical locations where racks of thousands of SIM cards are connected to servers. When a customer buys a verification for a specific service, the system automatically routes the request to a SIM card, captures the incoming code, and displays it on the buyer’s screen. Once used, the number is often recycled for a different platform, squeezing every penny of value out of the physical infrastructure.
“However, there exists a thriving market for buying and selling on-demand SMS verifications, which forms a cornerstone of the wider online manipulation economy.” – Anton Dek, Lead Author
The data from the COTSI index reveals that this marketplace runs on ruthless arbitrage. Scammers looking to inflate vanity metrics- like followers or likes- will flock to the cheapest countries. A verification from Indonesia or Russia might cost mere pennies to buy. This is in sharp contrast to markets like Japan, Australia, Turkey, or Malta, where prices are highest because regulations require photo ID or proof of residency to buy a SIM card. This creates a global race to the bottom, where the countries with the laxest telecom regulations become the primary exporters of digital fraud.
Closing the Loophole
The infrastructure of fraud makes manipulation cheap and scalable. Whether it’s a scammer needing 1,000 “people” to hype a new product, or a political operative needing 500 “locals” to sway a district, the SMS verification market is the logistical backbone that makes it possible. This highlights a critical weakness in platform safety: security measures that rely heavily on SMS checks are essentially being monetized by these gray market providers.
The most effective path, the study suggests, may be to tighten the supply chain. The team sees hope in legislative moves, pointing to the UK’s recent ban on SIM farms as a model. If governments can make it harder and more expensive to acquire SIM cards in bulk, they can drive up the cost of doing business for fraudsters. By forcing this market into the red, it might be possible to break the chain of online manipulation.
However, the researchers also offer a word of caution. This is an adversarial economy, and the market adapts fast. By publishing their methodology and the COTSI index, the team hopes to give policymakers a real-time radar for this activity. But they acknowledge that the providers they studied may simply retreat further into the shadows, locking down their data to keep their profitable business model alive.
Science: 10.1126/science.adw8154
ScienceBlog.com has no paywalls, no sponsored content, and no agenda beyond getting the science right. Every story here is written to inform, not to impress an advertiser or push a point of view.
Good science journalism takes time — reading the papers, checking the claims, finding researchers who can put findings in context. We do that work because we think it matters.
If you find this site useful, consider supporting it with a donation. Even a few dollars a month helps keep the coverage independent and free for everyone.